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PERPETUITiEs-Powers of Appointment-The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island has held that, in determining the validity of an appointment under
a general testamentary power of appointment under the Rule against
Perpetuities, the period for vesting shall be calculated from the time of the
exercise of the power.
IndustrialNat'l Bank v. Barrett,-

R.I. -,

220 A.2d 517 (1966).

The donor died in 1959 and, under his will, conferred upon his wife a
general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of a trust' in
which the wife had a life estate. In 1963 the wife died and under her will
exercised the general testamentary power to the Industrial National Bank,
in trust "to pay over the net income thereof to and for the use and benefit
of my granddaughters, Alice C. Lathan and Evelyn M. Barrett . . .
equally for and during the term of their natural lives, and upon the death
of either of them, to pay over said net income to her issue, per stirpes and
not per capita." The trust was to terminate "twenty one (21) years after
the death of the last survivor of the younger grandchild or issue of either
grandchild of mine living at my death.... ,8 At the donor's death the two
granddaughters and one great-grandchild were living. At donee's death six
additional great-grandchildren were in being. The major question presented was the validity of the appointment made under the Common Law
Rule against Perpetuities, the determination of which was dependent upon
whether, for the purpose of the Rule, the period of vesting would be calculated from the time of the exercise of the power or from the time of its
creation.4 If the vesting of the appointment is measured from the creation
it is invalid because the six additional great-grandchildren were not "in
being" at the creation of the power. Under a certification to the court of a
bill in equity for the construction of a will5 the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island took the other view and held the period for vesting shall be calculated from the time of the exercise of the general testamentary power in
determining its validity under the Rule against Perpetuities.6
In taking this view the court is the first American court to do so by case
1. It was initially argued that the power conferred was in effect a general power of
appointment exercisable during the lifetime of the donee. This was based on the provisions
found in the eighth clause of donor's will directing trustee's to pay donee, who was also
beneficiary for life, such principal as she should request for her own comfort and support.
However, this argument was rejected. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Barrett, - R.I. -, 220 A.2d
517, 520-22 (1966).
2. - R.I. at-,
220 A.2d at 520.
3. - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 520.
4. For the appointment to be valid the period had to be calculated from the power's
exercise. In some situations the validity might be sustained even if the period were calculated
from the creation of the power under the 'second look' doctrine. See 6 AmaacAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.35 (Casner ed. 1952). However, under the facts here the doctrine would not
apply.
5. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-28 (1956).
6. - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 524.
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law, at least with regard to the Common Law rule.' Generally the weight
of authority is that the period of perpetuities begins to run at the creation
of a general testamentary power. 8 This view is based upon the general
rule that, as to powers of appointment generally, the validity is determined
by calculating the period of perpetuities from the creation of the power.'
The reason for this rule is that the exercise of the power relates back to
the instrument creating the power and is considered the act of the donor."
However, where there is a general power to appoint by deed or will an
exception is made and the period is measured from the exercise of the
power." The reason for such exception is that under a general power
presently exercisable the donee is considered to hold the equivalent of
ownership for the purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities and, therefore, when the power is exercised it is not considered to relate back to the
instrument creating the power." In American jurisdictions," except those
noted, such exception has not been extended to general testamentary
powers.
But here the court takes the view that, when the general testamentary
power is exercised, the donee is at that time the practical owner for the
purposes of the rule, as he can appoint to anyone of his choice as well as to
his own estate. There is no restraint on alienation because the donee's
power is absolute. 4 Moreover, the court arrived at its conclusion because
"it is in line with the trend to obviate the technical harshness of the rule
against perpetuities and decide cases on the substance of things. 15
7. Wisconsin has also adopted this rule by case law. See Miller v. Douglas, 192 WIS.
486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927). However, this applied not to the common law rule but to
Wisconsin's statutory modification. See Wis. STAT. §§ 230.14-.15 (1965). For a discussion
of the Wisconsin rule see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 25.54-.57.
Delaware has established by statute that the period begins to run at the time of the
exercise as to all powers. DEL. CODE AeNN. tit. 25, § 501 (1953).
8. See Sm-Es & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTs § 1275, n.89 (1956, Supp. 1965) for citations.
9. See GRAY, TnE Rur. AGAINST PERPETUITIES, pt. 3 at 498 and § 514 (4th ed. 1942).
10. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.3 (Casner ed. 1952).

11. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 524.
12. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 24.33. See also GRAY,
op. cit. supra note 9, § 962 where it is stated that a general power presently exercisable is
"not really a power at all, but is a direct limitation in fee." But see Gold, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule against Perpetuities, 58 LAW QUAR. REv. 400, 413 (1942)
where the author states that the rationale of the special application of the rule to general
powers is not based upon the similarity to property but rather to the freedom of disposition
which they permit.
13. See Smsus & SMaIT, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1275, n.89 for citations to English cases.
The English view is the same as that reached by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, although
for a short period it was the same as that of the majority of the American jurisdictions.
14. - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 524; see Kales, General Powers and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 26 HAIIv. L. REV. 64 (1912); Thorndike, General Powers and Perpetuities,
27 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1914).
15. - R.I. at -,
220 A.2d at 524 citing 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 24.45 and RESTATEMNT, PROPERTY § 343 (1940).
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The question which was considered is one which has presented a great
deal of difficulty. It is argued that for the purposes of perpetuities the
donee of a general testamentary power is not practically the owner. It is
also argued that the "exception," i.e., calculating the period for perpetuities from the time of exercise of the power, can be made only where there
is a person who has the immediate right to become the absolute owner.'6
On the other hand, the view is taken that the issue of whether the donee is
practically the owner is only important at the moment of exercise and
that, in determining the validity of appointments made under a power in
respect to perpetuities, the proper question is whether "he can do everything with reference to the property subject to the power that he could do
if he were the owner."' The fact that the donee of a general testamentary
power may never technically become the absolute owner because his death
prevents it is irrelevant.
It may be true that a general power presently exercisable more closely
approximates absolute ownership in that the donee may appoint more
freely in respect of time. 8 However, "it is immaterial that the property is
tied up during the donee's life-the Rule itself allows that much of a
restraint upon alienation."' 9 Therefore, the latter interpretation, i.e., the
"exception" extended to general testamentary powers, would seem to be
the better view and this
is the view taken by the court in Industrial Na20
tional Bank v. Barrett.

There is another consideration which makes the court's holding the
more desirable result. Assume that A, the donor, gave B's first son, who
was not in being at the creation of the power, a general power of appointment by deed or will which could not be exercised until 21 years after B's
death. B has a son C who, when the necessary period elapsed, exercised
the power and made appointments similar to those made in Industrial
Nat'l Bank. The power is valid when created, 2' for the power "vests"
within the period of perpetuities 22 and the validity of the appointments
16. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, § 526.2. See also § 952 where it is stated "When a
testamentary power is given, the creator as distinctly means the donee shall never have the
fee." The same arguments presented in §§ 948-69 of GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9 may also be
found in Gray, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule against Perpetuities, 26 HIv.
L. REv. 720 (1913).
17. Kales, supra note 14, at 67. See also Thorndike, supra note 14, at 717.
18. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 10, § 23.4; RESTATEmENT,
PROPERTY, pp. 1813-14 (1940).
19. Bettner, The Rule against Perpetuities as applied to Powers of Appointment, 27 VA.
L. REv. 127, 149 (1940).
20. - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 524.
21. "If an instrument causes a general power presently exercisable to vest in the donee
of the power within the period of perpetuities, the power is valid." 6 AIrealcAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, Op. cit. supra note 4, § 24.31.
22. If the power created in the example were a general testamentary power and the
appointments made under the power were the same, they would be invalid because the power
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thereunder is determined from the date of exercise. But, under the
majority rule, if B were the donee of a general testamentary power and he
made the appointments in the same manner, the appointments thereunder
are invalid if measured from the creation. But if one analyses the examples in a "restraint of alienation" context, it can be seen that where C is
the donee the property is "tied up" for a longer period. This is so because
the power cannot be exercised until 21 years after B's death. Where B is
the donee, the power must be exercised, if at all, under B's will when he
dies. Yet, the former is valid and the latter invalid under the majority rule
although in the former the property cannot be "brought into the
market" until a later period. 3 To so state is inconsistent and permits a
scheme to be carried out by some words which cannot be done by others.
"[T]here is serious objection to a rule, purporting to express a policy,
which declares that this scheme can be carried out by some words and
cannot be carried out by others."2 4 Such objections can be made to the
"majority view" here and it must be concluded that the holding of the
court in Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Barrett answers such objections and
is consistent with obviating the technical harshness of the rule.2 5
Richard S. Dorizaun
ToRTs-Governmental Immunity-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
refuses to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Dillon v. York City School Dist., 422 Pa. 103, 220 A.2d 896 (1966).
Plaintiff, a minor, and her guardian brought suit against the defendant
for injuries sustained in a fall on the school's icy steps. The trial court
sustained a demurrer based on sovereign immunity from tort liability.
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's
order, held that it could not undertake piecemeal judicial reform of a
was invalid when created. C was not in being at the creation of the power and it is possible
that C would live more than 21 years after the death of A and B and might not be able to
exercise the power (he cannot until he dies) until such time. But this problem goes to the
validity of a power when created and not appointments made under a valid power. See
Kales, supra note 14, at 64-65.
23. See Thorndike, supra note 14, at 715.
24. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 24.9.

25. "The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as an elderly female clothed in the
dress of a bygone period who obtrudes her personality into current affairs with burst of
indecorous energy." Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror
65 HARv. L. REV. 721, 725

(1952).

By its decision, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island

has taken a step in clothing the lady in more "modern garb."
See the above cited article generally for some proposed solutions to the problems created
by the Rule against Perpetuities. However, it should be noted that although this article is.
cited in Barrett, - R.I. at -, 220 A.2d at 524, one of the problems not discussed in the
article is that which was before the court.

